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In the winter of 1715, the Swedish Baltic Empire lay in ruins. Since the 
defeat of the army at Poltava in 1709, all the provinces outside the Swedish 
heartland had fallen into the hands of enemy troops. Even Finland was 
occupied by the Russians. When the Swedish King Charles XII landed in 
Ystad, in the south of Sweden, he had many problems to deal with.1 One of 
the most urgent ones was to establish a postal route to the rest of Europe. 
With the country surrounded by enemies, all the postal routes to the out-
side world were cut off. The Government was in desperate need of infor-
mation from Europe, and eager to get in contact with the few remaining 
allies of the Swedish Crown.
This article is a case study of the organization of the Swedish postal route 
to Europe in 1716. In that year, the correspondence was sent via a postal 
route by sea between Gothenburg (Göteborg), on the Swedish west coast, 
and Amsterdam, in the Netherlands. The administration of the postal traffic 
was given to a private consortium of eight merchants. With privilege from 
the king, they were given full responsibility for the only state-organized, 
and publicly run, postal route from Sweden to the rest of the world in 1716.
The literature on the Swedish postal service in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries has mostly dealt with its internal organization. This is 
1 After the Battle of Poltava in 1709, and the following capitulation of the army, Charles 
XII fled to Bender, Turkey. There he stayed for four years, making unachievable plans for 
a joint operation with the Turks against the Russians. During this period, the king ruled 
Sweden by mail correspondence with the Council in Stockholm. A brief introduction 
to Swedish history during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century can be found 
in Paul Douglas Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). The military development and its consequences for the region are 
covered in Robert I. Frost, The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern 
Europe, 1558–1721 (Harlow: Longman, 2000).
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similar to the majority of the research about the postal services in Europe, 
and the rest of the world, which has mainly focused on the development in 
particular countries. These studies have mostly tried to explain the back-
ground to the emergence of the post, and after that, the ongoing organi-
zational development.2 From such a perspective, the postal route from 
Gothenburg in 1716 is a peripheral event, especially since it only lasted for 
half a year. However, if we analyze it at a more abstract level, separated 
from its practical solution, the organization of the postal route can be seen 
as an attempt to introduce a different economic and organizational policy 
into the Swedish Government. This policy, summarized further down in 
the text, called, among other things, for the participation of private mer-
chants. It is divergent to the common way of solving the Crown’s affairs at 
this time, and the solution with the merchants is to be viewed as an attempt 
to use private capital to solve state affairs.
In this article, it will be argued that the postal route from Gothenburg 
to Amsterdam in 1716 was a direct outcome of the military pressure put on 
the Swedish state in the winter of 1715. The isolation of the country called for 
extreme measures. It will also be argued that the postal route can be seen 
as a large-scale change in the economic policy advocated by the Swedish 
Crown. The use of a private consortium for the mail transportation is, in 
fact, a return to an older form of financing state affairs. This second expla-
nation shall be viewed as a hypothesis of a partly new and tentative way 
of looking at the reform policies of the latter part of the reign of Charles 
XII. Very little research has been done on the economic and organiza-
tional changes in comparison with the massive amount of research about 
the king’s wars and major policies. For that reason, our understanding of 
the Swedish civil administration in the final part of the Great Northern 
War (1700–21) is still incomplete.
2 Examples of the literature on the development of postal services are Teodor Holm, 
Sveriges allmänna postväsen: ett försök till svensk posthistoria, vol. I–V (Stockholm: 
Postverket, 1906–1929); Nils Forssell, Svenska postverkets historia, vol. I–II (Stockholm: 
Kungl. General-poststyrelsen, 1936); Otto Madsen, Et nyttigt og gavnligt Postværk: 
P&Ts historie til 1711 (Copenhagen: Generaldirektoratet for Post- og Telegrafvæsenet, 
1991); Finn Erhard Johannessen, Alltid underveis: Postverkets historie gjennom 350 år, 
1647–1920 (Oslo: Elanders, 1997); Wolfgang Behringer, Im Zeichen des Merkur: Reichspost 
und Kommunikations revolution in der Frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2003); Philip Beale, A History of the Post in England from the Romans to the 
Stuarts (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1998); Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The 
American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995). All of these authors focus on the development in their separate countries 
or land areas. No syntheses of the European development of written communications, 
transported via postal organizations, have been written so far.
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Seen from that perspective, the postal route to Amsterdam is an inter-
esting organizational exception that raises many questions. How shall we 
understand the unusual form that was chosen for the postal route? Why 
were private merchants engaged to solve the problem of mail transporta-
tion? In Sweden, the development of the postal service was closely linked 
to the state administration and the postal system was foremost arranged to 
suit the requirements of the Crown.3 Another interesting question is whether 
the postal route to Amsterdam was an attempt to test new forms of organ-
ization for the Swedish Post Office intended to be developed in the whole 
organization later on?
Instructions for a new postal route
Traditionally, the Swedish postal service used two alternatives for the mail 
correspondence to Europe: the postal road via Denmark, used since the 
Middle Ages, and the sea route from Ystad to Stralsund on the northern 
coast of Swedish Pomerania, established in the 1680s. The military situa-
tion, with the Swedish heartland surrounded by enemies, made both these 
postal routes unusable. When Charles XII landed in Sweden in the win-
ter of 1715, one of his first measures was to reopen the postal routes to the 
rest of Europe. From his quarters in Ystad, he sent a letter to the Governor 
of Gothenburg, Carl Gustaf Mörner, with orders to have the postmaster 
in the city supply some postal yachts for Holland.4 Later on the same day, 
the king sent a second letter to Mörner, instructing him to organize the 
aforementioned postal route with the help of some private persons. The 
king also sent a letter to the Chancery Board in Stockholm, letting it know 
about his orders to Mörner and instructing it to take measures to organize 
the postal route.5 The king’s second letter to Mörner reads:
As we find it necessary to arrange the foreign mail from Gothenburg to 
Holland, and as we think it is best that it will be done through some pri-
vate persons, who can investigate and arrange the postal yachts, there-
fore, it is our gracious command that you seek to arrange a lease con-
tract with someone in Gothenburg, by which the same person under 
3 See Magnus Olsson, “The development of the Swedish post office: A historical over-
view of the postal organization c. 1600–1721”, The Swedish Empire and the Baltic Postal 
Experience in the 17th and Early 18th Centuries, ed. by Heiko Droste & Kekke Stadin 
(Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, forthcoming, preliminary title).
4 Riksarkivet [RA], The government’s registry (RR), Kanslikollegium, inkomna Kungl. 
Maj:t brev, allmän serie 1711–1718, vol. EIa:6, Letter from Charles XII to Governor 
Mörner, 16 December 1715. 
5 RA, Letter from Charles XII to the Chancery Board, 16 December 1715.
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certain privileges and advantages will take on the investigation of the 
postal yachts and at least once a week send one to Holland.6
Mörner is accordingly instructed to find private persons in Gothenburg 
who are willing to take on the organization and operation of the postal 
route. These private persons would be rewarded with some kind of privi-
leges from the king. In his orders to Mörner, it is not clear what these will 
be. The aim of the king’s orders seems to be clear, though. If some private 
persons in Gothenburg could organize the postal route, the Crown would 
have reopened the postal routes to Europe without having to pay for it. 
This way of financing state affairs seems to fit in with the changes in the 
economic policy advocated by the king and his advisers.
After the Scanian War (1675–79), Sweden enjoyed the longest era of peace 
in the seventeenth century. During this period, the Crown’s finances were 
strengthened due to economic reforms and the reduction of fiefs from the 
nobility. All in all, the Crown’s financial apparatus was in relatively good 
shape when the Great Northern War broke out in 1700. The reform period 
beginning in the 1670s was influenced by so-called German cameralism. 
This was an economic theory, first developed in the 1650s, that was marked 
by its focus on the role of the state and its efforts to enhance the productiv-
ity. The origins of these ideas were foreign, and the Austrian Wilhelm von 
Schröder has been described as one of the theorists who most influenced 
the Swedish administrators.7 Cameralism has some elements in common 
with mercantilism, but differs in the way that it was used as a concept by 
its contemporaries. It is more of a social system, with its main focus on the 
well-being of the people, provided by a strong state authority.8 
From the beginning of the war, in 1700, the economic strategy practised by 
the Swedish Crown had the sole purpose of financing the war. Up to 1709, this 
was very much done with the help of the existing administration. Given the 
development in the previous decades, the economic policy had been turned 
into a state-controlled economy, following the legacy of the cameralistic 
6 RA, RR, Letter from Charles XII to Governor Mörner, 16 December 1715.
7 Cameralism is described in detail in Stellan Dahlgren, “Karl XI:s envälde – kameralistisk 
absolutism?”, Makt & vardag, ed. by Stellan Dahlgren, Anders Florén and Åsa Karlsson 
(Stockholm: Atlantis, 1993), 113–132; Åsa Karlsson, Den jämlike undersåten: Karl XII:s förmö-
genhetsbeskattning 1713 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1994), 62–66; about Schröder, Daniel 
Almqvist, “Feifs finansiella reformer och Wilhelm von Schröders ‘Fürstliche schatz- und 
rent-cammer’”, Karolinska förbundets årsbok 1922 (Lund: Karolinska förbundet, 1923), 
233–253. For a different view on cameralism and its importance to the economic theory, 
see Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism (London: Routledge, 1935; repr. 1994), vol. II, 263.
8 Dahlgren, “Karl XI:s envälde”, 118–121.
497Magnus Olsson: Postal round trip to Amsterdam
influences. Because of that, the war was initially financed without access to 
foreign capital and by using the state’s own resources.9 The financial policy 
during the reign of Charles XI had been turned into what can be described 
as state capitalism. Radical changes had been implemented towards state-
controlled export and price regulations. It was also characteristic that foreign 
moneylenders ceased to provide the Swedish state with loans.10
After the Battle of Poltava the Crown’s finances faced an unprecedented 
challenge. A new field army had to be recruited and great financial pres-
sure was put on the country. The period from 1709 up to the king’s death in 
1718 is, therefore, characterized by a new period of financial and organiza-
tional reforms. Most of them, if not all, focused on generating more money 
to carry on the war.11 The introduction of a property tax in 1713, viewed as 
strongly influenced by Schröder’s works,12 the new ordinance for the Chan-
cery in 1713, and the ordinance for the merger of the postal service and the 
innkeepers in 1718 are the  examples of this.
From 1714, the economic leadership in Sweden was marked by the king’s 
close collaboration with the Holstein baron Georg Heinrich von Goertz. 
At this time, the resources of the Crown to finance the war were virtually 
depleted. The economic organization developed in the second half of the 
seventeenth century had concentrated the economic tools in the hands of 
the Crown. The introduction of the property tax in 1713 is a good example 
of this. When this form of financing did not suffice, other ways of gener-
ating money had to be used. Goertz wanted to improve the finances with 
the help of a large bond loan, with security in the Crown’s income. This 
idea required the participation of merchants who, with a good supply of 
capital, could easily contribute with money. The whole idea failed in its ini-
tial design, even before it was implemented, mostly due to the merchants’ 
unwillingness to participate in its organization. Nonetheless, loans became 
the dominant solution for the Swedish Crown to cover its costs. The strat-
egy increased the national debt and when the king died in 1718, the debt of 
the Swedish state was estimated at sixty-five million silver dalers.13
9 James Cavallie, Från fred till krig: de finansiella problemen kring krigsutbrottet år 1700 
(Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1975), 101.
10 Eli F. Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa. Före frihetstiden, 2 
vols. (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1936), 288.
11 Karlsson, Den jämlike undersåten, 78–83; Gösta Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik 
under den Görtzska perioden (Lund: Lunds universitet, 1941), 3–5.
12 Almqvist, “Feifs finansiella reformer”, 233–253; Karlsson, Den jämlike undersåten, 24–25.
13 Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik, 372–373; Jan Lindegren, “Karl XII och det totala 
kriget”, conference paper from a session at Svenska historikermötet 2005 (Uppsala, 
498 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2009, 3/4 (129/130)
Nevertheless, Goertz’s ideas have similarities with the organization of 
the postal traffic from Gothenburg to Amsterdam. Also here, private mer-
chants were needed to organize the affairs of the Crown. To finance the 
postal route, Charles XII engaged private merchants – people with capi-
tal and means to start the traffic. A plausible hypothesis is that this way of 
organizing the postal route in 1716 has the same background as the changes 
in the larger economic and organizational policy advocated by the king 
and his advisers. When the state-controlled economic policy failed due to 
the war, the use of private capital was a way out of the crisis. In one way, 
this was a return to older forms of economic thinking. In the previous cen-
tury, “war by credit” had been the traditional way for the Swedish Crown 
to finance its wars. As in most European states the use of mercenaries and 
private armies was the standard way of financing military campaigns dur-
ing the first half of the seventeenth century.14 The method of using private 
entrepreneurs is also found in the previous system of tax farming in the 
early 1600s, used throughout Europe. Also then, the Crown’s need for ready 
money led to the involvement of private merchants.15
With his letters to Mörner, the king had taken almost the same actions 
as his state administrators in Stockholm had done. The Chancery Board 
discussed the problem of the postal isolation during the autumn of 1715. 
Just three days before the king’s letters to Mörner, the Board, through the 
general director of the Swedish Post Office, Henrik Bunge, sent a circular to 
the country’s post offices. In the letter, the administration of the Post Office 
informed its postmasters that a postal route should be established between 
Gothenburg and Holland. The post should leave Gothenburg once a month, 
and the postmasters were instructed to forward their foreign mail to the 
2005), <http://www.hist.uu.se/ historikermote05/program/sta_na_mil>, (30.5.2008). In 
1718, the total budget of the Crown was thirty-five million dsm.
14 The system of armies organized by private military entrepreneurs are discussed in David 
Parrott, “Cultures of Combat in the Ancien Régime: Linear Warfare, Noble Values, and 
Entrepreneurship”, The International History Review, 27:3 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005), 526–527: Hans Landberg, “Krig på kredit. Svensk rustnings finansiering 
våren 1655”, Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk 
stormaktstid, ed. by Landberg, et al. (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 1971), esp. 136–141; 
Sven A. Nilsson, “Kriegsfinanzierung während der schwedischen Gross machtzeit”, Det 
kontinentala krigets ekonomi: studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid, ed. by 
Landberg et al. (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 1971), 453–479.
15 Mats Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu: arrendesystemet och privatiseringen av skatte-
uppbörden (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2008), 53; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 95–121.
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post office in Gothenburg.16 Three days later, Bunge sent a letter to inform 
the Swedish commissioner in Hamburg, Barthold Huswedel, that all of the 
mail to Sweden would be sent by sea from Amsterdam to Gothenburg.17
The idea of a postal route from Gothenburg to Amsterdam was not 
entirely new. During the Great Northern War, the postal routes to Swe-
den were frequently interrupted. As an example, Swedish warships during 
1709 transported mail from Gothenburg to the mouth of the Weser River 
in the North Sea. In the same way, mail was transported on a Crown ves-
sel from Gothenburg to Holland in 1711. Both of these communication 
lines were unreliable.18
The king and his Chancery Board had, thus, independently it seems, 
been planning similar solutions to the postal problems. The king was a bit 
more optimistic in his plans with a post yacht leaving Gothenburg once a 
week, whereas the Board planned for one yacht a month. In his letters to 
Mörner, Charles XII assigned the commissionaire secretary in The Hague, 
Joakim Fredrik von Pries, responsibility for the letters when they arrived in 
Holland. In the Board’s plans, the merchant Adrian Werver was assigned 
to take care of the letters in Holland. At their meeting on 31 December 1715, 
the Board decided to write to the king and inform him of its measures to 
enhance the postal routes from Gothenburg.19
The result of the efforts in 1715, however, was that the Chancery Board 
revised its plans to follow the king’s orders. The Board concluded at its 
meeting on 3 January 1716 that the postal route should be started and that 
Commissionaire Secretary von Pries in The Hague was to be given orders 
to “not only arrange about the conveyance of the letters, each to its city, 
but also inform his Majesty’s servants abroad about it [the postal route via 
Amsterdam]”.20 At the same time, the Board decided to transfer a sum of five 
hundred silver dalers to von Pries for “the payment of the postage rates”.21
16 Såsom Kongl. Cantsselij Collegium har för godt funnit at låta inrätta en Siöpost emel-
lan Giötheborg och Amsterdam…, circular from the general postmaster, 19 December 
1715 (Stockholm, 1715).
17 RA, Överpostdirektören, huvudarkivet, registratur, vol. BIA: 17, 1715–1716, Letter 
from the general director of the Post Office to Commissioner Huswedel, 22 October 1715.
18 Johannes Rudbeck, Svenska postverkets fartyg och sjöpostförbindelser under tre hundra 
år (Stockholm, 1933), 282–288.
19 RA, Kanslikollegium, renskrivna protokoll, allmän serie, vol. AIIa: 26, 1715, Protocol, 
31 December 1715.
20 RA, Kanslikollegium, renskrivna protokoll, allmän serie, vol. AIIa: 27, 1716, Protocol, 
3 January 1716.
21 Ibidem.
500 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2009, 3/4 (129/130)
The contract with private entrepreneurs
During the spring of 1716, eight merchants in Gothenburg showed an inter-
est in taking on the postal traffic. It must be assumed that their initial con-
tact was with Governor Mörner, who on behalf of the king was to organ-
ize the postal route. The merchants, or the “entrepreneurs”, as they were 
called, put together a project for the postal route between Gothenburg and 
Amsterdam.22 In June, Mörner forwarded the project to the king, together 
with a memorandum from the entrepreneurs. In the memorandum, the 
merchants declared that they were willing to organize the postal route, if 
the king would grant them certain privileges:
In view of the great expenses, which will be necessary, we like to have 
his majesty’s gracious confirmation about the project that we in great 
humbleness enclose and that express what is our duty and what terms 
we must have if the enterprise shall be established.23
Charles XII accepted most demands put forward by the entrepreneurs, 
and about a month later, on 23 July, he issued a confirmation of the project. 
The confirmation letter was in the form of a royal ordinance and was also 
printed and sent to the post offices. Altogether it consists of eleven para-
graphs, regulating the postal traffic between Gothenburg and Amsterdam.24
The main point of the confirmation is that the entrepreneurs assumed 
total responsibility for all of the costs involved in the postal traffic. In the 
first paragraph, it says that four yachts were to be used for the traffic, one 
of them leaving Gothenburg every tenth day, weather permitting. The 
entrepreneurs were also granted a permit to open their own post office 
in Gothenburg to administrate the foreign mail, and they were allowed 
to charge postage rates for the letters sent by yacht. This also concerned 
the privilege of the letters free of postage, a case of constant abuse dur-
ing the time period.25 The confirmation letter also brings together the sea 
mail with the internal postal service. In the eleventh paragraph, the gen-
22 The eight merchants were Hans von Gerdes, Peter Tillrooth (ennobled Göthenstierna), 
Frans Schröder, Willhelm von Uthfall, Johan Andreas Olbers, Mathias Schilldt, Jacob 
Sahlgreen, and Hans Olofsson Ström.
23 RA, Kollegiers m. fl. skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Generalguvernörer till Kungl. Maj:t, 
Göteborgs-Bohuslän, vol. 1, Memorandum from the entrepreneurs, enclosed with the 
letter from Governor Mörner to Charles XII, 21 June 1716.
24 Confirmation Uppå Entreprenneurernes Project, till Påsternes fortskaffande emellan 
Giötheborg och Amsterdam (Stockholm: Kongl. tryckeriet, 1716).
25 Magnus Olsson, “Missbruket av fribreven inom det tidiga svenska postväsendet: den 
svenska posten som en del i moderniseringen av den karolinska staten”, Karolinska 
förbundets årsbok 2006 (Stockholm, 2006), 7–22.
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eral postmaster of the Post Office is ordered to assist the entrepreneurs by 
letting all the postmasters in the country know how they should proceed 
with the foreign mail. In a circular, the general director obeyed the will of 
the king, and an extract of the confirmation letter was later printed and 
sent to the postmasters.26
On the whole, the confirmation letter is mainly about the practical 
means of the postal route. In fact, the entrepreneurs wanted the king to 
extend his privilege to at least three more paragraphs, which, however, 
were not included in the final confirmation. The project sent to the king 
by Mörner is only partially preserved, although it is possible to reconstruct 
its full contents from the king’s reply sent to Mörner a month later. Charles 
XII writes that “we have gracefully given our consent to the greater part 
of the mentioned terms”.27 However, the king could not accept the entre-
preneurs’ wish to have the postage paid in silver daler. “Concerning the 
postage rate we will not agree to any exceptions, they shall use those Royal 
coins, which are common in the realm”.28 This request by the merchants 
is most likely due to the issue of emergency coins during the war. After 
Poltava, the king decided to produce extra sheets of copper, in an attempt 
to concentrate more money in the hands of the Crown. During the Goertz 
period, this practice turned into the coining of regular emergency coins, 
of which the first – the “kronan” – was on the market in the spring of 1716. 
The entrepreneurs most likely wanted their postage rates paid in ready 
money, instead of the emergency coins.29
Furthermore, the entrepreneurs asked to be privileged with the import 
of twisted tobacco. The king could not allow that, and writes: “we can nei-
ther give consent to the request that twisted tobacco will not be imported at 
any harbour on the western sea with ships other than the postal yachts”.30 
Finally, the entrepreneurs asked the king, because the postal yachts were to 
be exempt from documents according to the Swedish privateer ordinance 
issued by the Crown, to absolve the yachts from all claims by any priva-
26 RA, Överpost direktören, huvudarkivet, registratur, vol. BIA: 17, 1715–1716, Letter 
from the general postmaster to some post offices, 10 August 1716; Extract utaf Kongl. 
Maj:tz Nådige Confirmation, Uppå Entreprenneurernes Project, angående Postens inrät-
tande emellan Giötheborg och Amsterdam. dat. Högqwarteret Norby den 23. Julii 1716 
(Stockholm: Kongl. tryckeriet, 1716).
27 RA, RR, Letter from Charles XII to Governor Mörner, 23 July 1716.
28 Ibidem.
29 Lindeberg, Svensk  ekonomisk politik, 15–16, 19–20; Almqvist, “Feifs finansiella 
reformer”, 210; Bertel Tingström, “Görtz’ Caroliner”, Karolinska förbundets årsbok 
1997 (Stockholm, 1999), 104–114.
30 RA, RR, Letter from Charles XII to Governor Mörner, 23 July 1716.
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teers. Nor did the king approve this paragraph. He concludes his letter: 
“we assume gracefully that the entrepreneurs, despite the changes we have 
made to the project, shall be willing to take on the mentioned sea post”.31
In spite of the king’s rejection of the proposals for the three paragraphs, 
the only ones not concerning the practicalities of the postal traffic, the 
entrepreneurs launched the postal route in the early autumn of 1716. Appar-
ently, the eight men had intended to make profits on trade and business, 
parallel to the postal traffic. Even though the king rejected their requests 
for the privileges, they probably saw some potential to make money on 
the postal traffic itself. The source material from the traffic is fragmentary, 
and in the beginning the entrepreneurs most likely did not have any postal 
yachts to use. According to the Swedish postal historian Johannes Rud-
beck, the postal route was started with the help of merchant ships, sailing 
from Gothenburg to Amsterdam.32
For some reason, Charles XII was not satisfied with the entrepreneurs. 
In a letter to Governor Mörner on 6 November 1716, hardly five months 
after signing the confirmation, the king cancelled the contract. In the let-
ter, he says that the entrepreneurs “have failed in several parts so that we 
have found it necessary to cancel the contract and arrange for the letters 
in a different way”.33 The king does not say explicitly which of the entre-
preneurs’ failures he is referring to. Neither have we any clues to how the 
postal route was to be organized later on, nor how the problem of mail 
correspondence was solved. A hypothesis is that various sea routes across 
the Baltic Sea soon came into operation again. Despite that, it is hard to 
figure out why the king stopped the private postal route to Amsterdam. 
According to the abovementioned sources, the postal traffic did not cost 
the Crown any money and, as far as we know, it seems to have worked.
The king ordered Mörner to inform the entrepreneurs of the cancella-
tion of the contract. Later, in December the following year, the king wrote 
to the Chancery Board, and asked it to sort out the financial matters for 
the postal route run by the entrepreneurs. Charles XII wanted the eight 
merchants to “show whether they have fulfilled the contract, and if they 
are not able to do so, they shall send a full account of their expenditures to 
the post office, so that we gracefully will remunerate their actual costs”.34 
This proved not to be one of the easiest things to do. The issue was fre-
31 RA, RR, Letter from Charles XII to Governor Mörner, 23 July 1716.
32 Rudbeck, Svenska postverkets fartyg, 293.
33 RA, RR, Letter from Charles XII to Governor Mörner, 6 November 1716.
34 RA, Kanslikollegium, inkomna Kungl. Maj:t brev, allmän serie 1711–1718, vol. EIa:6, 
Letter from Charles XII to the Chancery Board, 18 December 1717.
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quently discussed by the Board in the following year, and, finally, at the 
meeting on 18 October 1718, the Board agreed that it would issue a fine of 
two hundred silver dalers if the entrepreneurs did not produce a record 
of their accounts.35 However, this threat did not reach the entrepreneurs 
before they had sent in their papers, which reached the Chancery Board 
on 25 October. The accounts, dated 20 October, reported on the collected 
postage rates and the expenses paid by the entrepreneurs. Concerning the 
surplus of the business, the entrepreneurs were willing to let the king keep 
the money: “the entrepreneurs declared themselves willing to give up to 
his majesty what they could have to claim for postage rates from various 
persons”.36 Whether the postal traffic generated a surplus, or if the entre-
preneurs were accountable to the Crown, is partly shrouded in mystery.37 
Rudbeck, who cites the accounts, says that the postal traffic lasted between 
23 July and 19 November 1716. This would have generated a surplus for the 
entrepreneurs of 1,511 silver dalers. The disagreement about the figures 
ended in 1721, according to Rudbeck, resulting in the entrepreneurs not 
having to pay the surplus to the Crown.38
The private postal traffic between Gothenburg and Amsterdam, thus, 
ended after only five months. The shape of the entrepreneurial organiza-
tion, stated above, leads us to a couple of conclusions. The first one, and the 
most obvious, is that the war was the primary reason for the organization 
with the private consortium of merchants. The Swedish state administra-
tion was, in the winter of 1715, put under enormous pressure, and the only 
way of getting in contact with the Continent was to use ships sailing from 
Gothenburg. This could, of course, have been done by using Crown vessels 
and navy personnel. Nevertheless, the starting time for a state-organized 
postal route would have been much longer. With the help of the entrepre-
neurs, the postal traffic could start sooner and at a cheaper price than the 
Crown could arrange.
35 RA, Kanslikollegium, renskrivna protokoll, allmän serie, vol. AIIa: 29, 1718, Protocol, 
18 October 1718.
36 RA, Kanslikollegium, renskrivna protokoll, allmän serie, vol. AIIa: 29, 1718, Protocol, 
25 October 1718.
37 I have not been able to locate the accounts in the archives. There are several clues in 
the sources of how the accounts were sent back and forth within the administration. The 
paper itself is, however, missing. Rudbeck has copied parts of it for his book; therefore, 
it must have been available in the RA in the 1930s. One reason for my failure to find the 
accounts might be that the main archive for the Swedish Post Office (Överpostdirektö-
rens arkiv) was reorganized in the 1980s.
38 Rudbeck, Svenska postverkets fartyg, 294–295.
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The use of private entrepreneurs may be viewed in a wider European 
context. In this case, the Swedish solution in 1716 reflects the ways the postal 
traffic was organized on the European continent. Private postal systems 
were a common form of organization, particularly in the northern parts 
of the Holy Roman Empire. As an example, the postal system in the city of 
Hamburg was organized with the help of private merchants. The Swedish 
Crown was familiar with the Hamburg post since the early 1600s. Consid-
ering the Swedish involvement in the German wars in the 1630s, this way 
of organizing the post must have been well known to the Swedish admin-
istrators. A private postal system was also arranged in the Swedish Baltic 
provinces Livonia and Estonia during the 1630s and 1640s.39
Yet another answer would be that the administration used the private 
entrepreneurs to test new forms of organization for the postal service. In 
one way, the postal route from 1716 is a harbinger of the ordinance of the 
merger of the postal service and the innkeepers in 1718. The ordinance 
introduced a completely new postal system, and, like the entrepreneurial 
organization in 1716, it focused primarily on private enterprise. It shifted 
the responsibility for the mail transportation from the Swedish peasantry 
to the innkeepers. They would arrange for the transportation together with 
passenger traffic. The reform was never implemented due to the death of 
the king.40
I would suggest a hypothesis that the organization of the postal route in 
1716 is an expression of a change in the economic and organizational policy 
implemented in Sweden from 1709 onwards. After the Battle of Poltava, 
Charles XII and his collaborators reformed the state administration to 
generate more money for the war. When the Crown’s own resources did 
not suffice, new steps had to be taken and the policy of a state-controlled 
economy had to be partly abandoned. A leading principle in these changes 
was to lay hands on the capital of private merchants, both in Sweden and 
abroad. Goertz’s plan for a big bond loan has been mentioned, and shows 
the more general idea of the change in the economic policy. The main 
39 About the postal system in the Holy Roman Empire, see Behringer, Im Zeichen des 
Merkur. The private post in Livonia and Estonia are described in Enn Küng, “The attempts 
to establish private postal system in the Swedish Baltic Sea provinces in the beginning 
of the 1630s”, Sõnasse püütud minevik: honorem Enn Tarvel, ed. by Priit Raudkivi and 
Marten Seppel, (Tallinn: Argo, 2009), 178–189. About Hamburg in Gerhard Ahrens, 
“Das Botenwesen der Hamburger Kaufmannschaft (1517–1821)”, Archiv für deutsche 
Postgeschichte, 1 (1962), 28–42.
40 The ordinance of 1718 is described in Forssell, Svenska postverkets historia, vol. I, 
146–154.
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object was to involve the merchants and private enterprises to contribute 
money to the Crown.41 Partly, this policy is a return to an older form of 
financing state affairs. The way of giving privileges to private persons for 
executing certain tasks for the Crown was well known since feudal times. 
Likewise, as earlier stated, this policy has similarities with the financing 
of the Swedish wars in the seventeenth century.42
However, there are more explicit comparisons to be made with the 
postal route in 1716. One is the sea customs paid by the foreign trade on 
the Swedish sea routes. In 1714, Charles XII decided that the sea customs 
should be leased to a private entrepreneur. In his orders, sent from Stral-
sund, the king wanted the Treasury Board to find “entrepreneurs that every 
year in advance can pay the sum of the leasehold receipts”.43 The inflexible 
rules of the customs rates made the business unprofitable, though, and no 
one showed interest in the contract. In 1718, the rules were changed, and 
the general director of the sea customs, Johan Ehrenpreus, signed a lease.44 
Concerning the chosen method of organization, the sea customs and the 
postal route show the same pattern and can both be viewed as expressions 
of a change in the economic policy.
One reason why the entrepreneurial postal route and the lease of the sea 
customs did not work out in the favourable way that the Government had 
planned might be the changed form of the leases. The use of leases in search 
of more money for the Crown had been tested in Sweden long before the 
1710s. A good example is the tax farming during the reign of Gustav Adolf 
in the 1630s. At that time, the lease generated a quick cash contribution to 
the Crown.45 In the 1710s, the leases had taken the form of the anticipation 
of future taxes. These advances were lengthening more and more, with the 
obvious result that the total sum of money did not increase.46 This explana-
tion is plausible for the cancellation of the postal entrepreneurs’ contract. 
The entrepreneurs might have organized the postal route quicker than the 
41 Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik, 372–373; Lindegren, “Karl XII och det totala”, 1–2.
42 Compare the previous references to Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu; Landberg, “Krig 
på kredit”; and Cavallie, Från fred till krig.
43 RA, RR, Letter from Charles XII to the Treasury Board, 15 December 1714. Also 
quoted in Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik, 13, fn. 51.
44 Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik, 12; Jan Berggren, “Överstyrelser och cen-
tralförvaltning 1636–1824”, Tullverket 1636-1986: en jubileumsbok (Stockholm: General-
tullstyrelsen, 1986), 49–50.
45 See Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu, for a thorough examination of the system of tax 
farming in Sweden between 1620 and 1635.
46 A point made by Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik, 13, and also developed in Hal-
lenberg, Statsmakt till salu, esp. 215.
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Crown could. In the long run, however, the Swedish state would most likely 
make more money if the postal route was controlled by the Post Office. 
An argument for this is the comparatively large amount of money that the 
entrepreneurs appear to have made on the postage rates. This answer is in 
line with the idea of state capitalism and shows that the economic policy 
can hardly be viewed as a fixed programme. Rather, it is a symptom of the 
hitherto unmentioned ad hoc solutions. The financing of the wars or the 
organization of the Post Office did not follow a grand master plan. Many 
of the steps analyzed above are most likely products of accidental circum-
stances. However, there was some sort of thinking behind the decisions 
taken by the Swedish leadership. The way of organizing the postal route 
to Amsterdam might have been the best decision based upon the available 
information at that time.
To sum up, the above study has shown that it is plausible to view the 
entrepreneurial postal route in 1716 as an illustration of the change in the 
Swedish economic and organizational policy in the latter part of Charles 
XII’s reign. There is good evidence that the method of using private entre-
preneurs for the organization of the postal route is a sign of the reorienta-
tion of economic thinking in the Swedish state administration. The organ-
ization with the entrepreneurs was not primarily a result of the military 
crisis. On the contrary, there was an underlying idea for the actions taken 
by the Swedish leadership in economic matters after 1709. This resulted in 
a policy that, in a more direct way, tried to engage private merchants and 
entrepreneurs in the financing of state affairs. In one way, this policy was 
a return to an older form of financing. This strategy, however, came to an 
abrupt end with the death of the king in November 1718, and many of the 
reforms were rapidly abolished. In the history of the Post Office, the most 
obvious example is the ordinance of the merger of the postal service and 
the innkeepers in 1718. After the king’s death, the regulation was abolished 
and the older ordinances restored. The following period can be seen as a 
time of restoration when the new leaders strived to put the state organi-
zation back as it was. The help from private entrepreneurs to solve postal 
matters was a thing of the past, at least for the time being.
Magnus Olsson (b. 1977) is a Ph. D. student at Södertörn University.
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Kokkuvõte: Postitee Amsterdami: eraettevõtjad Rootsi 
postisüsteemis 1716. aastal 
Artikkel uurib Rootsi postikorraldust 18. sajandi algul, vaadeldes näidisjuh-
tumina Rootsi ja Euroopa vahelise postitee organiseerimist 1716. aastal. 1715. 
aasta talvel, mil Karl XII maabus Lõuna-Rootsis Ystadis, oli Rootsi Lääne-
mere-impeerium varemetes ning kuninga ees seisis hulk lahendamist vaja-
vaid probleeme. Üks pakilisemaid oli Rootsist teistesse Euroopa riikidesse 
kulgeva postitee sisseseadmine, sest traditsiooniline postitee läbi Taani 
oli sõja tõttu katkenud ning Rootsi valitsust ähvardas infosulgu jäämine. 
1716. aastal saadeti kirju mööda mereteed Göteborgist Amsterdami. 
Postiliikluse administreerimine usaldati kaheksast kaupmehest koosne-
vale erakonsortsiumile. Kuninga privileegiga anti neile täielik vastutus 
ainsa Rootsist Euroopasse viiva postitee eest. 
Artiklis esitatakse hüpotees, et erainvestorite kaasamine postitee raja-
misse 1716. aastal peegeldab muutusi Rootsi majandus- ja halduspoliiti-
kas Karl XII valitsuse hilisemal perioodil. Alates 1680. aastatest oli Rootsi 
majanduspoliitika põhieesmärgiks olnud ressursside koondamine riigi 
kätte. Karl XI rajas ulatusliku bürokraatiaaparaadi nende ressursside hal-
damiseks. Süsteem, kus riik kontrollis suuremat osa Rootsi majandusest, 
lagunes seoses 18. sajandi alguse sõdadega, sest valitsus üritas hankida 
finantse eraettevõtjate abiga. 
Erakapitali kaasamine riigi funktsioonide finantseerimisse oli Rootsis 
(ja ka teistes Euroopa riikides) olnud 17. sajandi esimesel poolel tavapärane. 
Eraettevõtjate rakendamine riikliku postitee organiseerimiseks on üks 
näide muudatustest riigivõimu majanduslikus mõtlemises. Artikkel näitab 
seega, kuidas kaupmeeste ja ettevõtjate kaasamine riigiasjade finantseeri-
misse oli tagasipöördumine vanemat tüüpi finantseerimismudeli juurde. 
